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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) is a success story and is one of 
only five such agencies with comparable success.  If the main stakeholders maintain their 
current support and approach to it, that success should continue. 
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) approach to the project with ANAMA 
has proven to be a large part of this success and although its impact is now less – given the 
increasing strength of ANAMA – its role is still very important. 
 
All the Outcomes and Outputs assessed by this evaluation have been met. 
 
ANAMA wishes to expand its reach beyond Azerbaijan, initially – possibly - to Afghanistan, 
Georgia and Tajikistan.   With the possible exception of Afghanistan, this appears entirely 
possible. 
 
Its wish to create a centre of excellent has already been achieved but its apparent wish to 
become a regional centre needs further thought.  The concept has merit but the form it 
would take and the geographical spread are unclear. 
 
A very large part of ANAMA‟s success has been due to the constructive support of the 
Government of Azerbaijan and the international donors.  UNDP and ANAMA will need to 
work together to ensure the continuation of the support both in form and substance.  
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MAIN REPORT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) was formed by the Presidential 
Decree of 18 July 1998.  It is the national agency responsible for all aspects of mine action 
activities within Azerbaijan including management and co-ordination related issues.  It is 
responsible for national planning, prioritisation, training, standards and quality management, 
resource mobilisation and co-ordination of all mine action activities within Azerbaijan.  It is 
implementing its activities through two national non-government organisations (NNGO) 
alone.  In the early years international mine action organisations were also contracted.  
 
On 2 April 1999 the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the State 
Commission for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction signed a joint Project Document to cover 
the first two years of the development of mine action capacity in Azerbaijan.   The project 
was aimed at developing a national capacity to deal with the landmines and unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) threat which would enable a mine free environment in war-affected 
territories of Azerbaijan. The Mine Action Programme in Azerbaijan was a joint project 
between UNDP and the Government of Azerbaijan with UNDP helping with capacity 
building, providing technical expertise, and attracting international funding.  
 
The government later requested that the project be extended for a further two years1. The 
UNDP Azerbaijan evaluation plan required an outcome evaluation to be conducted and this 
was undertaken in April 20042. 
 
The present joint project covered the period 1 October 2005 – 1 October 20083 with the 
stated purpose: 
 
“... to amend and reconsider the project activities and budget for the duration of 3 
years.  Revised project is oriented on strengthening and further expansion of the 
mine action capacity in Azerbaijan in order to remove the threat of landmines 
and explosive devices in accessible war-affected areas and rapidly react when 
occupied areas will be restored.” 
 
1.2 Outcomes and Outputs 
 
The United Nations Development Assistance Framework4 (UNDAF) states the National 
Priority 1 as: ”The system of governance ensures an enabling environment for development, 
poverty reduction, and respect for human rights and freedoms”. 
 
The Country Programme Output 2.15 states: “The Government implements effective mine 
action” with a corresponding Output of: “Support provided for landmine/UXO clearance, mine 
risk education, and mine victim assistance”. 
 
The UNDP Country Programme document5 repeats the Outcome (Multi-Year Funding 
Framework (MYFF) Goal 4.4) and the Output (2.14.1) and gives the indicators as square 
                                            
1
  State Commission for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, letter dated 19 December 2001  
2
  Baric (Consultants) Ltd. Evaluation of the UNDP Mine Action Programme in Azerbaijan. 29 
April 2004. 
3
  Strengthening and Further Expansion of the Mine Action Capacity in Azerbaijan. 
4
  United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2005-2009. 
5
  UNDP Country Programme for the Republic of Azerbaijan (2005-2009). 
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metres cleared and number of casualties per year but without stating what those numbers 
should be.   
 
The Project Document6 specifies three Output Targets: 
 
1. Integrated mine action programme in Azerbaijan. 
 
2. UXO clearance in Saloglu village of Agstafa district. 
 
3. Strengthening the capacity of ANAMA. 
 
An Outcome Evaluation of this latest project period has been undertaken and the findings 
are set out below.   
 
1.3 Purpose of the evaluation 
 
The current UNDP project with ANAMA ends in October 2008 and this evaluation is tasked 
to provide lessons learned, findings and recommendations covering the following areas: 
 
 Adequacy of the project design to achieve the country programme output. 
 
 The progress made towards achieving the outcome, the reasons for any shortfall and 
whether there have unintended effects. 
 
 The relevance and effectiveness of the strategies to achieving the outcome. 
 
 Factors beyond UNDP‟s control that affect the outcome. 
 
 Any part played by UNDP‟s outputs and other interventions (including soft assistance) in 
achieving the output. 
 
 Effectiveness of UNDP‟s partnership strategy and whether it assisted in achieving the 
outcome.  
 
 The feasibility of ANAMA with its current capacities becoming an international training 
centre and a centre of excellence. 
 
The unusual aspect of this evaluation is contained in the last bullet point above and it is 
discussed in some detail later in this report.  UNDP is keen to continue its relationship with 
ANAMA and decisions on the best way to move forward will, at least to some extent, be 
based on the recommendations of this report. 
 
1.4 Methodology used in the evaluation 
 
The author visited Azerbaijan between 6 and 10 October for discussions with key agencies 
and people, and he undertook a field visit to the Khanlar Training Centre.  Key details are: 
 
 The Terms of Reference (TOR) are set out in Annex A. 
 The visit itinerary is shown in Annex B.  
 A list of the people met is in Annex C.   
 The author also researched relevant documents and some are listed in Annex D.     
 
                                            
6
  Strengthening and Further Expansion of the Mine Action Capacity in Azerbaijan. 
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The author knows ANAMA well, having visited Azerbaijan in 1996 to make initial 
recommendations for the creation of a national mine action structure in the country and has 
visited eight times since.  He also undertook the Outcome Evaluation in 2004. 
 
The report is structured in line with the sample shown in the annex to „Guidelines for 
Outcome Evaluators‟ but adjusted to meet the requirements set out in the TOR. 
 
 
2. ANAMA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
It is popular with some international mine action organisations to claim that there is no 
effective national mine action co-ordination organisation anywhere in the world.  They are 
wrong; there are many failures but there are some significant successes.  There are 
probably five very effective organisations of which ANAMA is one7.  None of these countries 
has been subject to large-scale international interventions and they have realised that the 
initiative lies with them; if they do nothing, nor will anyone else.  By and large they have 
found their own solutions to their problems and, in some cases, are ahead of other countries 
in their conceptual thinking and operational implementation. 
 
Azerbaijan does not enjoy a good reputation for its transparency and corruption is a problem. 
Yet ANAMA shows what can be achieved with the right mix of benign government support, 
effective leadership, high quality staff and sensible international support.  The Director8 is a 
very effective manager and greatly respected by his staff.  He was on holiday during the 
evaluation which was a pity as his views and plans for the future would have been most 
welcome.  However, his staff were very open and honest; they had been instructed to 
declare the problems as well as the successes. 
 
2.2 Structure 
 
The structure of ANAMA is shown in the diagram below9 and is quite conventional in its 
design.  All the departments report to the Director which avoids any possibility for confusion 
and the agency is not so big that this imposes an unreasonable burden on him.     
 
The relationship of effective management supported by a high level of technical competence 
is critical to ANAMA‟s continued success; neither will survive without the other.  The Director 
is already aware of many of the technical issues and he attends the annual Meeting of 
States Parties (MSP) as an Observer to the Ottawa Convention10 as a representative of 
Azerbaijan. It was not clear the extent to which others in ANAMA are exposed to 
international contact and, although some were, the Director might wish to consider extending 
such opportunities.  If ANAMA wishes to extend its reach beyond Azerbaijan (see Section 3 
below), the more international experience its staff has, the more credibility ANAMA will have 
as an international centre.  
                                            
7
  Albania, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Jordan and – possibly – Yemen. 
8
  Mr Nazim Ismaylov. 
9
  Taken from the ANAMA website: http://www.anama.baku.az.  
10
  Also known as the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). 
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The departments function well together and there is an obvious feeling of camaraderie 
between the senior people involved.  All the departments are important but the two key 
functions are Operations and Quality.  There should be close synergy between these and 
within ANAMA that is the case. 
 
2.3 Operational activities 
 
ANAMA undertakes the full range of operational mine action activities11 but as Azerbaijan is 
not a States Party to the Ottawa Convention it is not involved in advocacy.  Its activities are 
covered in detail in the Annual Reports and they are not repeated here.  Should more detail 
be required than is presented in this evaluation, ANAMA should be asked for a copy of the 
Annual Reports. 
 
Two key projects are worth mentioning here: one completed in 2007; the other ongoing. 
 
 The government required about 19 km2 of land to be cleared at Zobjug so internally 
displaced person (IDP) families could be resettled in newly built houses and ANAMA 
was given about a year and a half in which to complete the project (a very short 
period of time).  Through innovative use of procedures and technology, the task was 
completed on time and to the required quality.  Some of these new procedures were 
developed by ANAMA alone and are well ahead of those in many other countries.  
 
 A very large former Soviet ammunition depot exploded some years ago scattering 
munitions over a very large area (in excess of 40 km2).  In co-operation with the 
NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) ANAMA is clearing both the depot 
and the surrounding area, and will be doing so for some years yet.  It is a very large-
scale project and some very innovative techniques are being used.  Another former 
Soviet munitions depot has been discovered about 70 km outside Baku which will 
require clearance at some time.  
 
                                            
11
  These are sometimes referred to as the „Five Pillars‟ of mine action and include: demining 
(including survey, marking and clearance), advocacy, mine risk education, victim assistance 
and stockpile destruction.  
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The innovation mentioned merits some explanation.  There are a number of issues over 
which there is much philosophical debate – and very little outcome – taking place 
internationally.  This is discussed again later in the next paragraph.  The more 
straightforward innovation is that being used at Saloglu where the ANAMA specialists have 
developed some uniquely simple means of burning ammunition and small items of explosive 
ordnance.  
 
 
The interest of the left hand picture is the ANAMA-designed and locally made burning 
container and the simple use of fuel to ignite the burn.  It is cheap, effective and safe. 
 
The philosophical debate affects two issues but it is, essentially, the issue of risk 
management.  For some in the international community it is a subject which raises 
unacceptable implications; that the mine clearance industry is prepared to put lives at risk.  
That position is nonsense as almost everything humankind does carry some risk and in most 
cases that risk is known and accepted.  Clearing land is a risk reduction process (mostly to a 
very high extent) and not one of risk elimination. The innovation here is whilst others have 
debated – and done nothing – ANAMA has debated and then developed very effective 
procedures to undertake what is now being called „land release‟.  It is a subject in which the 
author is deeply involved and he often raises ANAMA‟s innovative approach to the subject 
demonstrated by the release of land at Zobjug.  The international community has things to 
learn from ANAMA. 
 
2.4 Implementing partners 
 
The majority of the work is undertaken by two national NGOs: Relief Azerbaijan and the 
International Eurasia Press Fund.  Although technically independent of ANAMA it is doubtful 
that there is much real competition between them.  In a truly competitive environment that 
would be a cause for concern but in many ways it is little different from the relationship 
between donors and international NGOs and the grant arrangements.  It appears that the 
NNGOs are subject to detailed external quality assurance and control and so long as that is 
honestly and fairly applied the risks of poor workmanship are much reduced. 
 
External companies have been used from time-to-time when there is a requirement for 
specialised input.  This is the case for Saloglu (see below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baric (Consultants) Ltd 
 
9 
 
3. THE EXPANSION OF ANAMA’S ROLE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
ANAMA recognises that it has things to offer others outside its own borders and is 
considering setting up an international training centre at one of its two regional training 
centres (the Khanlar Training Centre).  The scale of the international reach it foresees is not 
clear but appears to be largely regional.   
 
 The Georgian Government has formally requested ANAMA assistance in setting up a 
Georgian mine action centre to oversee the clearance of former Russian 
contamination (not only that left from the recent conflict). 
 
 Tajikistan has also requested assistance to bolster the capability of its mine action 
centre. 
 
 The Government of Azerbaijan undertook a formal visit to Afghanistan and an 
ANAMA representative participated.  The Afghan Department of Mine Clearance 
(DMC) requested ANAMA assistance in developing its capabilities. 
 
There is an ambition to create an international „Centre of Excellence‟ and this is discussed 
below. 
 
3.2 Georgia and Tajikistan 
 
These requests are straightforward and well within the capability of ANAMA.  The Khanlar 
Training Centre in Goygol is well suited to run training courses of the type likely to be 
required and the instructors are experienced and competent.  So long as there is a clear 
understanding of what each side expects, and there is funding in place, meeting these two 
requests should not present any serious problems. 
 
3.3 Afghanistan 
 
The request from the DMC requires some care.  The author was in Afghanistan 31 October 
– 8 November and, with the agreement of ANAMA, discussed the matter with the UN Mine 
Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA) and, in particular, with its Director (Dr Haider 
Reza, the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs).  Unfortunately it was not possible to 
meet the Director of DMC.  Dr Reza was a little surprised at the request from DMC as it is 
co-located with UNMACA and they are working together with UNMACA providing peer 
training.  Next year the DMC will be moved to new premises on the edge of Kabul and 
UNMACA will again co-locate with it.  Dr Reza is very clear that UNMACA will hand over 
responsibility increasingly to DMC but the complete process will not be quick (not likely 
before 2013 at the earliest).  It is understood that DMC took an active role in the 
development of the latest Integrated Operational Plan for 1388 (1 April 2009 – 31 March 
2010). 
 
That said, and as Dr Reza himself agrees, DMC is still very weak and will require significant 
support if it is to develop.  There may be a role in this for ANAMA and as the request came 
from an inter-government mission it should not be ignored but caution is required and some 
preparatory work is essential. It is suggested that ANAMA should undertake a feasibility 
study to understand precisely: 
 
 What the DMC expects. 
 What is required to make the DMC functional. 
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 Whether either is realistic and sustainable. 
 The view of the government. 
 The view of UNMACC. 
 Who will provide funding? 
 The security implications 
 
3.4 Centre of excellence 
 
ANAMA already is a centre of excellence and this has been highlighted above.  As such it 
could provide a good base for an international centre of excellent but the question is, who 
would it serve and in what region?  The author is no expert on regional politics but there are 
three obvious options. 
 
3.4.1 The Caucasus12 
 
 North Caucasus includes: Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and North Ossetia (this is 
not a complete list).   
 
 South Caucasus includes: Georgia (including disputed Abkhazia, South Ossetia), 
Armenia, Azerbaijan (including disputed Nagorno-Karabakh) and Turkey. 
 
It seems unlikely that Russian will defer to a non-Russian centre of excellence which thus 
rules out North Caucasus.  In South Caucasus, for much the same reason, Abkhazia13 and 
South Ossetia are unlikely clients.  Given present relations with Armenia and Nagorno 
Karabakh, only Georgia and Turkey are left.  The view of Turkey on the matter is not known. 
 
3.4.2 Central Asia14 
 
In the modern context Central Asia goes east from the Caspian Sea and includes 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan and 
Mongolia may also be included in Central Asia, as well as north-eastern Iran and the 
western Chinese provinces of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet. 
 
It seems unlikely that China would acknowledge ANAMA as a centre of excellence and the 
view of Iran and Mongolia is not known.  The most likely client group is the remainder. 
 
3.4.3 South East Europe 
 
This comprises Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Romania and Serbia15.  Azerbaijan is already a member of the South East 
Europe Mine Action Co-ordination Council (SEEMACC)16 which is not, nor does it pretend to 
be, a centre of excellence.  It is a forum for sharing experience17.  Albania and Croatia have 
very effective mine action centres of similar capability to ANAMA and they might claim they 
have little to learn from ANAMA. 
                                            
12
  Adapted from Wikipedia. 
13
  The HALO Trust has been active in Abkhazia for many years and has already created an 
Abkhaz Mine Action Centre.  So long as the HALO Trust remains, an international centre 
managed by ANAMA is unlikely to be of interest. 
14
  Adapted from Wikipedia. 
15
  Adapted from www.southeasteurope.org.  
16
  www.see-demining.org/main.htm.  
17
  Members are the mine action centres of Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
Croatia and the International Trust Fund.  Observers are: Montenegro, the mine action centre 
in Serbia, the mine dog centre in BiH, Kosova and Macedonia.  
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3.4.4 The rest of the world 
 
If ANAMA wants to be truly international, it should assess what it can offer potential clients 
outside the regions discussed above.  That may seem to be a step too far but it should not 
be discounted immediately.  It is probably unrealistic in the short to medium term for ANAMA 
to do this alone but it might achieve it in co-operation or partnership with others.   
 
Some examples are: 
 
 The International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) based in Nairobi18 may be a 
suitable partner.  The author has visited it many times but not in the past two years. 
 
 The International Trust Fund (ITF) has been a source of funding for ANAMA and it is 
looking to expand its role overseas beyond its current limits.  It is about to finalise a 
new strategy for 2009-2013 which allows it to seek a much wider role than hitherto19.  
One of those new roles might be institutional capacity development and ANAMA 
would be well suited to help it. 
 
 The US government has previously referred to ANAMA as the „jewel in its crown‟ and 
it may be willing to use it as a strategic training partner in nearby countries instead of 
sending in American organisations.  The ITF and the US State Department already 
have a partnership arrangement. 
 
There is merit in taking a progressive approach to expansion.  Trying to do so too rapidly, 
and alone, could be harmful to ANAMA‟s reputation.  There is no obvious case to support 
global expansion but that might become clearer once a more limited expansion gains 
momentum. 
 
3.4.5 Possible way forward 
 
There is merit in ANAMA exporting its expertise but it will be difficult to set up an 
international centre without the agreement of potential clients within nearby regions or 
elsewhere in the world.  There may be three key factors which impact on ANAMA‟s 
aspirations: 
 
 It will need to articulate what it believes to be its „unique selling point‟.  In other words 
what can ANAMA offer that is needed by others which it can provide better than 
anyone else? 
 
 Worldwide aspirations will be limited by the ability of more distant potential clients to 
go to Azerbaijan.  The main issue for most will be that of cost.     
 
 Azerbaijan not being a States Party to the Ottawa Convention will deter some 
potential clients.  Even a country like the USA – also not a States Party – sometimes 
has problems with its international status despite being comfortably the biggest donor 
to mine action. 
 
There may be three ways forward: 
 
                                            
18
  This is a UK funded facility which is managed by the British and Kenyan armies. 
19
  The author is a member of the team which undertook the strategic review. 
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 As ANAMA has been asked for assistance by three countries, it could simply let it be 
known more widely that it willing to act as a training facility for others, irrespective of 
the region of the world in question.   
 
 The SEEMACC model could be extended more widely to include the Caucasus and 
Central Asia.  This will still allow ANAMA to offer training and allow it to develop 
relationships with additional willing partners.  However it is understood that 
SEEMACC has become too inflexible and is not now a suitable model in its present 
form. 
 
 There may be merit in ANAMA considering strategic partnerships as discussed in 
Section 3.4.4 above. 
 
3.5 Funding 
 
Although the European Commission (EC) is presently providing no funding to ANAMA 
(because the new EC Instrument is limited to a Good Partnership policy), in principle, it 
would be interested in funding cross-border (Good Partnership) activities.  It has a significant 
fund for Georgia managed by EuropeAid in Brussels.  There are other regional funds that 
could be used for work in the other countries.  It is suggested that the Director should have 
discussions with the Delegate (when he is in post) to explore the possible availability of 
Good Partnership funding for his projects. 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) operates what are called „Conflict Prevention Pools‟ which are 
funds used to assist with conflict prevention, peace support and other related endeavours.  
The Department for International Development (DFID) – already a donor to ANAMA through 
UNDP – is one of the contributors to the Pool budgets.  It is suggested that the Director also 
has discussions with the British Embassy to explore this possible source of funding to 
support his international projects. 
 
3.6 Recovery of the occupied territories 
 
Understandably Azerbaijan wishes to recover the territory presently annexed by Armenia 
and, if that happens, the expectation is that a considerable amount of clearance will be 
required.  The two countries are technically still at war and deaths occasionally do occur on 
both sides. It is not clear to the author whether a rapprochement is likely anytime soon but 
the advice provided during the visit suggests not.  ANAMA recognises that if it does happen 
there will need to be an increased land clearance capacity to assist the many IDPs who will 
want to return to their former homes.   
 
To capitalise on the likely rush of donor support, and the urgency of the task (IDPs are 
unlikely to wait for clearance before going back to their land), ANAMA should have a well 
thought out concept of operations.  Given the uncertainties, there will be changes to the 
concept but it will be too late if it is left until agreements are concluded.  The Director may 
wish to consider the following issues: 
 
 The scale of the potential problem should be estimated.  Although Azerbaijan has no 
control over the area in question, it seems improbable that it has no information. 
 
 How the initial physical survey would be undertaken to assess or confirm, in much 
more detail than is possible now, the true scale of the problem. 
 
 Some rough estimates should be made on which techniques are most likely to be 
needed.  What proportion of the land will possibly need full mine clearance and what 
Baric (Consultants) Ltd 
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proportion might possibly need battle area clearance.  In addition, what proportion of 
land might possibly be released through technical survey, non-technical survey and 
straightforward cancellation?  In there is no other means of estimating this, then the 
experience within the current borders of Azerbaijan could be used. 
 
 Mine risk education programmes will be important and the most appropriate means 
of achieving them should be considered.  As part of this, some physical marking 
(signs and possibly fencing) will be needed to warn people of suspect danger areas. 
 
 The key issues are those of resources required (whether funding or technical 
capacity) and the number of years over which the work will be undertaken. This is a 
classic project management task and at this stage a critical path analysis might be 
helpful.  Once more details are known, this can be converted to a Gantt chart.   
 
 Developing a plan for resource mobilisation.  Who will be approached to provide 
funding?  Who will be approached to provide the technical resources?  
 
It is important to stress that this is all a process of estimation based on the best information 
available.  However, it will probably be too late to start this process after the territories are 
recovered when many people may move spontaneously, thus putting themselves at risk in 
uncleared areas. 
 
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) developed an excellent rapid response 
operational plan for Lebanon which was implemented once Israeli forces withdrew in August 
2006.  Although there were some significant changes once the fighting stopped, most of the 
resources were agreed on the basis on the draft plan which was circulated before the 
withdrawal.  No doubt UNMAS would provide a copy of this document if requested.  
 
 
4. FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Status of the outcomes 
 
4.1.1 Country Programme Output 2.15  
 
(“The Government implements effective mine action” with a corresponding Output of: 
“Support provided for landmine/UXO clearance, mine risk education, and mine victim 
assistance”.) 
 
This output has been met and comprehensively so.  The government continues to support 
ANAMA and its activities in two important ways: 
 
 It provides funding and over the period April 1999 to September 2008 it has been the 
second largest donor after the USA20 (see the table below). This is an important 
contribution because it demonstrates a clear commitment to mine action.  The 
government has many other priorities which require funding and it is encouraging that 
the importance of mine action is recognised.  Oil revenues make the country potentially 
very wealthy and as the end of the first ten years of the Ottawa Convention approaches, 
international donors may become more selective about where they allocate their money. 
Most donors prefer a shared relationship and may increasingly look for a strong 
government financial commitment.  Compared to many other countries, Azerbaijan has 
demonstrated its commitment but it may have to do more.  
                                            
20
  Table provided by UNDP on 3 December 2008.  
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Funding April 1999 – September 2008 
Donor 
Sum 
(USD) 
Government of Azerbaijan 10,629,461 
Government of Japan 635,531 
Government of Canada 65,000 
Government of the USA
21
 12,537,731 
Government of Norway 112,140 
Government of the UK 925,000 
Government of Italy 640,000 
Government of Sweden 95,240 
Government of Saudi Arabia 50,000 
European Commission 3,730,000 
NATO PfP Trust Fund 1,056,730 
UNDP 2,080,436 
UNICEF 213,310 
ITF 644,135 
Charitable clubs and 
Foundations 
258,285 
Total 33,672,999 
 
 Equally as important as the funding – and arguably even more so – is the 
government‟s willingness to provide support without obvious interference.  By doing so it 
has allowed the development of a very effective and internationally respected mine 
action agency.  As indicated earlier ANAMA is one of very few truly effective national 
mine action agencies and the government should be proud of that fact.  Of course, the 
government will direct ANAMA on certain issues – such as the clearance of the land for 
resettlement at Zobjug – but ANAMA‟s hard won success could be very quickly lost if the 
government were to interfere in internal management issues, such as, the appointment of 
staff.  A very large part of ANAMA‟s success is the quality and commitment of its staff. 
 
Government and international support allows “... landmine/UXO clearance, mine risk 
education, and mine victim assistance” to be undertaken.   That said, it is hardly a 
challenging target, although probably a sensible one.   
 
There can be a fixation on arithmetic outputs such as how many square metres have been 
cleared, how many landmines or UXO have been destroyed and so on.  These are not 
irrelevant figures but they can be a small part of what should be achieved.  Unfortunately, 
the real value that mine action can bring may be hard to measure and may not be fully 
realised until long after the clearance task has been completed. The table below22 provides 
the numbers of metres cleared using the techniques indicated against certain key targets.  
When this report is read, these figures will be out of date as work will be ongoing but it 
highlights two weaknesses: 
 
 The targets set were in anticipation of donors providing the funding required to meet 
them.  In some cases there was a funding shortfall but simply looking at numbers, 
such as those shown below, the reader might assume a failure in productivity.  That 
might be a flawed judgement. 
 
 The question donors are increasingly asking when looking at numbers of square 
metres cleared is “so what?”.  Unless donors are willing to fund a country‟s Article 5 
compliance – not relevant in the case of Azerbaijan – then they are more likely to be 
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  Including USD 234,000 from USEUCOM. 
22
  From a table provided by ANAMA during the visit. 
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interested in the societal value of the clearance.  The Zobjug project is a very good 
example of what donors like to see; land cleared for the resettlement of IDPs.  Land 
cleared to reduce or prevent casualties, to help reduce poverty, to improve 
infrastructure and so on are all equally good.  The problem is, that they are often very 
hard to quantify and may not be fully achieved for some time – even years – after 
clearance is completed. 
 
Operation 
Total m
2
 for 2008 
(at September 2008) 
Target 
(m
2
) 
Clearance 
562,525
 
manual 
 
1,729,945 battle area 
clearance 
 1,500,000
 
manual 
 
No target set 
Technical survey 8,040,020 10,000,000 
Minefield clearance with MDD 
support 
228,375 500,000-600,000 
Area processed using 
mechanical means 
3,000,000 1,177,945 
 
4.1.2 Project Document Output Targets 
 
 Integrated mine action programme in Azerbaijan. 
 Unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance in Saloglu village of Agstafa district. 
 Strengthening the capacity of ANAMA. 
 
The mine action programme is highly integrated with all aspects being co-ordinated by 
ANAMA.  The „hard issues‟ of mine clearance and unexploded ordnance disposal (EOD) are 
well managed and targeted.  The „soft‟ issues of mine risk education (MRE) and victim 
assistance are also well managed.  MRE is highly co-ordinated from government level down 
to community level and the active involvement of schools.  Victim assistance is well covered 
although it appears rather less well funded. Many mine action centres tend to focus on the 
hard issues and virtually ignore the soft issues.  It is very much to ANAMA‟s credit that all 
aspects of mine action are integrated so fully into an overall strategy. 
 
Operation 
Progress at September 
2008 
Target 
Mine risk education 
48 MRE committees in 4 
districts 
 
250 school identified and 
teachers selected for MRE 
training 
 
28,130 MRE materials 
(books, manuals etc) 
produced 
Community based MRE 
groups in 10 districts 
 
500 teachers from 250 
schools trained 
 
 
MRE text books 
(18,000) and manual 
(1,000) produced 
Saloglu project 253,479m
2
  cleared 800,000m
2
 to be cleared 
 
Although it was not visited, the UXO clearance at Saloglu appears to be very well done and, 
again, ANAMA has developed some innovative procedures which are being used there.  The 
work has been undertaken in conjunction with NAMSA and discussion is ongoing to agree a 
third phase of support.  NAMSA has approved Phase 3 but the finance has not yet been 
agreed.  When it is – hopefully next month - it will come from the Partnership for Peace fund, 
supported by a number of NATO countries with Turkey being the lead nation.  ArmorGroup 
has been hired to develop the operational concept for Phase 3 and Turkey will provide an 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialist to advise.  
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Strengthening the capacity of ANAMA has been an on-going commitment and a constant 
theme throughout this report is the success of that commitment.  This output is not simply a 
matter of maintaining the status quo but seeking to improve capacities and capabilities still 
further.  Given ANAMA‟s already high standard, the rate of improvement will undoubtedly 
slow down but it should continue to implement a process of continual professional 
development both as an agency and for its staff.   
 
4.2 Factors affecting the outcome 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
There are four clear factors which have affected the outcome and all have been positive.  
Whilst each factor is important in its own right – and some more than others – it is the 
combination of them that has created the success in Azerbaijan. 
 
4.2.2 The government 
 
The Government of Azerbaijan‟s benign support has already been discussed above and is 
not repeated here.  There is merit in the government giving some indication when it thinks it 
will be in a position to entirely fund ANAMA given its present responsibilities and tasks.  That 
would help donors understand that their support is not taken for granted. 
 
Its unwillingness to accede to the Ottawa Convention is not helpful and will be a 
discouragement to some donors (see below).  The government uses the fact that it has no 
control over the land occupied by Armenia as a justification but the Treaty states23: 
 
“Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-
personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as 
possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention 
for that State Party.” 
 
The occupied territories are not under the “... jurisdiction or control ...” of Azerbaijan 
and are thus not included in the Treaty obligation at this stage.  If the land is returned 
to Azerbaijan the land will then be subject to the Treaty but it is probable that the 
government will be given a ten year period from that time to comply. 
 
4.2.3 Donors 
 
Continuing donor involvement has been important (see the table in page 11). Given its oil 
revenues, the government could possibly fully fund ANAMA and perhaps, one day, it will.  
However, given the many calls upon the State Budget at present that is unlikely.  Without 
international funding, the likely outcome will be a cessation of the development of ANAMA 
and a reduction in its operational capacity. There are two dangers: 
 
 International donors, recognising ANAMA‟s capability, may decide to divert their 
funding to countries where the national agency is less successful and support 
appears to be needed more.   
 
 As the end of the first ten years of the Ottawa Convention approaches, and the 
consequent high political focus on it, some donors may decide Azerbaijan‟s refusal to 
accede to the Treaty should not be rewarded.  There is now no humanitarian 
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emergency in Azerbaijan and development funding is sometimes managed 
differently, sometimes by different people in different departments or, occasionally, 
by a different government ministry.  
 
It would be a shame if donors walked away and ANAMA and UNDP should endeavour to 
encourage donors to continue their funding.   
 
4.2.4 UNDP 
 
UNDP‟s support for national mine action capacity building at the National Execution (NEX) 
phase has not always been successful and there are many examples around the world to 
support this statement. UNDP recognises this24: 
 
“The implementation of national execution as the main modality for UNDP-
assisted programmes, has been difficult due to its rapid and evolutionary nature.” 
 
Why it has been successful in Azerbaijan and, most probably, is due to the combination of 
the factors being discussed in this section.   
 
“With the advent of NEX, UNDP now plays a host of roles, including that of 
partner of government, donor, facilitator of management, assistant project 
administrator, and performance monitor.” ... “Governments readily accept the 
ideology that under NEX they have the final executive responsibility for their 
programmes, only to find that UNDP continues to set the terms, control the 
funds, and monitor their performance.”25  
 
Importantly UNDP has deployed in Azerbaijan what has been called elsewhere a „light 
footprint‟.  It plays the „host of roles‟ mentioned above without alienating the government. 
 
The need to keep donors involved with ANAMA is mentioned above and this may be a 
greater challenge in the future that hitherto.  In addition to existing donors, UNDP should 
assist ANAMA in finding new sources of funding and two options (EC and the UK) were 
mentioned earlier. 
 
If the occupied territories are returned, UNDP‟s assistance will be especially important, not 
just for mine action of course, but the needs of ANAMA should be recognised quickly as IDP 
return will not be safe without a rapid response by ANAMA; initially with MRE but then will 
rapid response clearance. 
 
UNDP also provides a protective environment within which ANAMA can function without 
undue pressure from inside or outside the country.   
 
As ANAMA moves forward with its international ambitions, UNDP‟s help will be important, 
especially as it can call on assistance from its offices in the countries in question. 
 
4.2.5 Clear vision and realistic work plan 
 
Perhaps because it is not a signatory to the Ottawa Convention, ANAMA‟s vision does not 
suffer the hyperbole of „mine-free‟; it sensibly uses the word „safe‟.   
 
                                            
24
  National Execution: Promises and Challenges, Chapter 6, see: 
www.undp.org/eo/documents/nec6.htm  
25
  Ibid. 
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“Vision:  The territory of Azerbaijan safe for the people to live free from the threat 
of landmines and explosive devices, in an environment conducive to 
development, where mine victims are fully integrated into society.”26 
 
ANAMA has long recognised, much as we might wish it otherwise, that mine clearance, EOD 
etc, are risk-reduction processes, not risk-elimination.  This allows it to focus on the real 
technical issues rather than politically-driven objectives.  Its annual work plans are thus well 
formulated and realistic.  
 
4.2.6 Quality and commitment of the staff 
 
Even if all the above factors were in place, ANAMA would most probably fail if it were not for 
the quality and commitment of its staff.  This has been discussed elsewhere in this report 
and is discussed no further here. 
 
4.3 UNDP’s contributions to the outcome through outputs 
 
This section should be read as an adjunct to that above where UNDP as a factor is 
discussed. 
 
During the visit, ANAMA staff were pressed to explain their view of UNDP‟s role.  Without 
exception they were supportive and wanted the relationship to continue.  The key issues for 
them were: 
 
 UNDP was a necessary channel to attract funding from international donors. 
 
 It provided visibility for ANAMA and allowed it to get international exposure that 
otherwise would be more difficult to gain. 
 
 The Mine Action Exchange (MAX) programme by which selected people were funded 
to travel to another mine-affected country to get experience was especially 
welcomed. 
 
 UNDP had, in the past, provided some high calibre Chief Technical Advisors (CTA) 
whose role was to assist and advise ANAMA.  The last two, in particular, were key to 
the recent development of ANAMA. 
 
The MAX programme merits a brief explanation and a caution.  The fundamental objective of 
the programme is sound; much experience and confidence can be gained by visiting other 
programmes.  However, funds for the MAX are very scarce and it is important that the right 
person is allocated to each exchange visit.  They are not holidays, they are opportunities to 
gain experience but also, and importantly, to share experiences with the host.  Although 
UNDP has been the source of funding so far, there is no reason why ANAMA could not 
allocate some of its own money if the MAX continues to be a valuable tool.   
 
4.4 UNDP partnership strategy 
 
It appears that UNDP is well regarded in Azerbaijan, at least so far as its relationship with 
ANAMA is concerned (the author looked no further than this).  As explained above, its role is 
very much appreciated by ANAMA staff and – from previous discussions with him – by the 
Director.  Although no discussions were held with the government this time, it is clear from 
previous meetings with the Deputy Prime Minister that government support was in place.  A 
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number of donors do, or have, passed their funds through the UNDP Trust Fund.  Indeed, 
since 1999 it appears, from the figures seen, about 85% of the funds have passed through 
UNDP, including government money. 
 
It would appear from this that the partnership strategy is successful. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The UNDP/ANAMA project is a considerable success and if the main stakeholders maintain 
their current support and approach to it, that success should continue. 
 
All the Outcomes and Outputs assessed by this evaluation have been met. 
 
The project faces two challenges: the wish to expand the reach of ANAMA beyond 
Azerbaijan; and the need to keep the donors involved for some years yet to come.  Both of 
these are discussed above and both are achievable given careful planning.  
 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
These are offered in order they were raised in the main text, not necessarily in order of 
priority. 
 
6.1 It would be helpful to both ANAMA and the individual if the Head of Operations were 
able to attend the Intersessional meetings associated with the MSP. 
 
6.2 The requests by Georgia and Tajikistan for assistance, although entirely possible, 
need some further clarity before implementation. 
 
6.3 The request by the DMC in Afghanistan for ANAMA should be treated with care and 
only implemented after a detailed feasibility study. 
 
6.4 The ambition to create a region centre of excellence has considerable merit but 
thought is required on the form it should take. 
 
6.5 The Director should explore options for Good Partnership funding with the EC and 
possible access to Conflict Prevent Pool money with the British Embassy. 
 
6.6 If not already in place, a Concept of Operations should be developed to provide a 
rapid response capability should the occupied territories be returned to Azerbaijan. 
 
6.7 If not already in place, ANAMA should develop a policy on continuous professional 
development for its staff. 
 
6.8 It would help ANAMA‟s aspirations to become an international centre of excellence if 
Azerbaijan were a States Party to the Ottawa Convention.  It is hoped that the 
Director will continue to try to persuade the government to accede to the Convention. 
 
6.9 UNDP and ANAMA should recognise the risk of donor apathy following the end of the 
first ten years of the Ottawa Convention and work to counter it. 
 
6.10 ANAMA still needs UNDP support and a new project should be agreed.  It should be 
expanded to assist ANAMA with its international ambitions using, if necessary, the 
UNDP offices in the countries in question. 
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Annex A 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
Outcome Evaluation 
Mine Action 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
From 1988 through 1994, the conflict between Armenian forces and Azerbaijan resulted in 
the occupation of 20% of the Azerbaijani territory and the displacement of 15% of the 
population of Azerbaijan. A changing front line resulted in mass destruction of housing, 
infrastructure and productive resources not only in occupied regions, but also in surrounding 
territories.  
 
A general mine/UXO survey completed in 11 regions of the accessible areas revealed that 
an estimated 60 million square meter of land is contaminated in 64 villages of these regions. 
The size and scope of the problem is not known in areas under the occupation of Armenian 
forces. 
 
The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has been formed by the 
Presidential Decree of July 18, 1998.  On 2 April 1999 the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and the State Commission for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction signed a 
joint Project document to ensure the development of mine action capacity in Azerbaijan.  
The Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme is aimed at developing a national capacity to deal 
with landmines/UXO threat, which would enable the mine free environment in war-affected 
territories of Azerbaijan. UNDP is assisting with the capacity building, technical expertise and 
resource mobilization in accordance with international standards 
 
Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) manages and coordinates 
comprehensive mine action. ANAMA‟s de-mining activities have improved access to houses, 
infrastructure, and surrounding areas. More than 17 million square kilometers were cleared 
in 2007, and 81 houses and five schools were certified as safe. Since the UNDAF cycle 
began in 2005, ANAMA has certified more than 44 square kilometers to be mine-free. In 
addition, sustainable, community-based mine risk education initiatives and medical, 
psychological, and employment services for mine victims have helped to reduce the impact 
of mines/UXOs. This creates a safe living environment, an enabling environment for 
development, and income generation opportunities for the populations of seven mine-
affected regions.  
 
ANAMA covers the full spectrum of de-mining activities in compliance with international 
standards. A process of building national capacity rather than relying on international 
subcontractors has enabled ANAMA to achieve cost-effectiveness. ANAMA‟s unit cost mine 
clearance is about US$ 1 per square kilometer, compared to US$ 2-3 in most other 
programs worldwide. As a result, ANAMA has achieved impressive results with its limited 
budget (US$ 13.6 million since its creation in 1999). It is estimated that in most other 
countries the same results would have required between US$ 20 to 40 million. 
 
Sharing the good practices of ANAMA has the potential to benefit mine-affected people in 
other countries. A feasibility study on the promotion of ANAMA as a international mine action 
center is anticipated. 
 
The project contributes to the achievement of the UNDP Country Programme Outcome: 
The Government implements effective mine action through the output “Strengthened and 
expanded Mine Action Capacity in Azerbaijan.” This output is achieved through the following 
deliverables: 
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 Provision of the training to the staff 
 Improving external relations of ANAMA  
 Improving access for individual houses and surrounding areas 
 Reducing impact of mines/UXOs on local population 
 
The project fact sheet is available at www.un-az.org/undp 
 
2. OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION 
 
The outcome evaluation shall assess the short medium and long term results of Azerbaijan 
Mine Action Programme. It includes an assessment of the effectiveness, efficiency and 
sustainability of the programme against their objectives, contribution and external factors. 
The outcome evaluation should also examine non-intended effects of the programme.   
 
The evaluation at the outcome level is to assess progress of UNDP‟s project interventions 
towards achievement of the Country Programme Outcome - The Government implements 
effective mine action, including contributing factors and constraints. The evaluation should 
also generate lessons and experiences that could provide inputs or feed into the review of 
the current Country Programme and/or design and implementation of the next Country 
Programme. 
 
Evaluation is undertaken in the last year of the project‟s implementation. This timing was 
decided to enable the evaluator to not only assess the performance of the project itself but to 
assess the sustainability of the project‟s results upon its completion and provide  
recommendations to UNDP and key project beneficiaries on further actions to sustain and 
expand the results achieved and additional strategies/interventions to fully achieve the CP 
outcome. 
 
The findings of evaluation will serve as an input to the formulation of the next phase of the 
Mine Action Programme in Azerbaijan.     
 
3. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 
 
The outcome evaluation will be looking at the relevance and contribution of UNDP project 
activities with regard to the CP Outcome and evaluate the efficacy of strategies employed in 
contributing to the achievement of outputs. The scope of evaluation is expected to include 
lessons learnt, findings and recommendations in the following areas: 
 
 Assess adequacy of the project design for the achievement of the CP outcome and 
project outputs; 
 
 Assess what and how much progress has been made towards achievement of the  
outcome, in part or full, the reasons for any shortfall in its achievement and whether 
any unexpected effects have occurred; 
 
 Assess relevance and effectiveness of the applied strategies to the achievement of 
the outcome; 
 
 Analyse the underlying factors beyond UNDP‟s control that influence the outcome 
(including the opportunities and threats affecting the achievement of the outcome); 
 
 Assess whether UNDP‟s outputs and other interventions (soft assistance) can be 
credibly linked to the achievement of the outcome; 
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 Assess whether UNDP‟s partnership strategy has been appropriate and effective, 
including the range and quality of partnerships and whether this has contributed to 
the achievement of the outcome. 
 
 Assess the existing capacities of mine action agency in provision of training and 
guiding supports relevant to all aspects of mine action activity and make 
recommendation as to feasibility and perspective for creation of the training resource 
institute of international standard        
 
Geographically the evaluation will cover Baku and a selected mine affected region of 
Azerbaijan targeted by the project.  
 
The evaluation will cover the project throughout its duration from 2004 to the end of 2008.  
 
4. PRODUCTS EXPECTED FROM THE EVALUATION 
 
The evaluation is expected to produce a detailed report with findings, recommendations and 
lessons learnt covering the scope of the evaluation at the outcome level. The structure and 
content of the report should meet the requirements of the UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation 
Policy.  
 
5. EVALUATION APPROACH 
 
Desk-top review of documentation including:  
 
 UNDAF and UNDP Country Programme 2005-2009 
 UNDP Evaluation Policy 
 National Mine Action Strategy  
 Reports on Mine Action activities 
 Project Document  
 Annual Project Progress Reports  
 Information and education materials (printed and video) produced by the project 
 Any other information available 
 
Interviews with: 
 
 ANAMA 
 non-governmental organizations working with ANAMA 
 local authorities of mine affected regions 
 State Committee for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation 
 Partners and Donors to the project 
 Meeting with direct beneficiaries 
 
Field visitst to a selected mine affected region of Azerbaijan  
 
6. EVALUATION TEAM 
 
The evaluation team should include one international independent evaluator who at no point 
was directly associated with the design and implementation of the project activities. 
 
Duties and responsibility of the evaluator: 
 
 Design detailed evaluation scope and methodology 
 Conduct participatory evaluation of the project; 
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 Conduct interviews/meetings with relevant medical professionals, stakeholders, 
Government, donors, beneficiaries; 
 Draft evaluation report; 
 Present draft evaluation report to key stakeholders in a debriefing meeting; 
 Ensure that the report is finalized within maximum 3 weeks after the mission 
completion. 
 
Area of expertise and qualifications: 
 
 Minimum 5 years of experience in mine action 
 Experience in conducting evaluations and assessments; 
 Knowledge of mine action international policies and programmes; 
 Proven expertise in project/programme management; 
 Good professional knowledge of the CIS region; 
 Strong analytical and report writing skills;  
 Computer literacy;     
 Knowledge of English is mandatory.  
 
Equal opportunity will be provided to individuals and companies with evaluation expertise. 
 
7. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS 
 
The evaluation is being initiated by UNDP Azerbaijan Country Office. As such, UNDP CO 
will prepare the schedule of evaluation mission, provide copies of the project documentation 
for review and arrange meetings. The Office will also arrange for transportation and if and 
whenever necessary for interpretation during the mission. UNDP shall provide an overall 
briefing to the evaluator upon arrival. The evaluator will be working closely with the ANAMA. 
 
UNDP will provide the evaluator with logistical support such as issue of visa, hotel 
reservation, working space in the UN House premises with access to internet. 
 
The evaluator is requested to travel with his/her own laptop. 
 
The following timeframe for the evaluation mission is proposed: 
 
 Desktop review  - 2 days (could be partly or fully done from distance) 
 Briefings of evaluator, meeting with ANAMA – 1 day 
 Visit to the field, meetings/interviews – 2 days 
 Finalization of the reports – 2 days 
 Debriefing 1 day  
 
The evaluation mission should take place in the 3rd quarter of 2008. 
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Annex B 
 
ITINERARY 
 
 
 
 
Date Activity Comments 
 
Sunday 5 October Alistair Craib departs UK 1450 UK time 
Monday 6 October 
Alistair Craib arrives Baku Airport 
 
Initial meeting at UNDP 
 
Introductory meetings at ANAMA 
 
0045 local time 
Tuesday 7 and 
Wednesday 8 
October 
Field visit to Goygol District to 
Include: 
 
 Visit Regional Centre 
 See Training Centre facilities 
 Briefings 
 
 
Thursday 9 October Detailed meetings at ANAMA  
Friday 10 October Meeting at British Embassy 
 
Meeting at EC Delegation 
 
Meeting at US Embassy 
 
Final meeting at UNDP 
 
Saturday 11 October Alistair Craib departs Baku Airport 
 
Alistair Craib arrives UK 
0810 local time 
 
1015 UK time 
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Annex C 
 
PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 
 
 
 
Agency Name Appointment 
   
UNDP 
 
Shamil Rzayev 
 
 
 
Jamila Ibrahimova 
 
 
Senior Programme Advisor & Team Leader 
for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
 
 
Assistance to the Resident Representative 
ANAMA 
 
Samir Poladov 
 
Adil Aslanov 
 
Elnur Qasimov 
 
Musa Jalalov 
 
Fikret Aliyev 
 
Nigar Vagabova 
 
 
Operations Manager 
 
Senior Supervisor 
 
Team Leader TSQA Division 
 
Head of MRE 
 
Senior TQA Officer 
 
Plans Officer 
EC Delegation 
 
Rza Zulfugrzade 
 
Programme and Project Manager 
US Embassy 
 
Peter Andreoli 
 
Political Officer 
British Embassy 
 
Declan Byrne 
 
Second Secretary Political Affairs & HM 
Consul 
Landmine Monitor 
 
Emil Hasanov 
 
Mine Action Researcher (CIS & Middle East) 
and Editor 
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Annex D 
 
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 
 
 
 
Author Title Date 
 
Cranfield University Strategic Planning Options September 2003 
UNDP Project Fact Sheet  
UN Country Team 
United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework 2005-2009 
 
UNDP 
UNDP Country Programme for the Republic of 
Azerbaijan (2005-2009) 
October 2004 
UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators 2002 
Government of 
Azerbaijan / UNDP 
Strengthening and Further Expansion of the Mine 
Action Capacity in Azerbaijan 
August 2005 
ANAMA 
Annual Report 2004 and Work Plan 2005 
Annual Report 2005 and Work Plan 2006 
Annual Report 2006 and Work Plan 2007 
Annual Report 2007 and Work Plan 2008 
 
Website: www.anama.baku.az  
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Annex E 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ANAMA  Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 
DFID   Department for International Development 
DMC   Department of Mine Clearance 
EC   European Commission 
EOD   Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
IDP   Internally Displaced Person 
IMATC   International Mine Action Training Centre 
ITF   International Trust Fund 
LIS   Landmine Impact Survey 
MAX   Mine Action Exchange 
MBT   Mine Ban Treaty 
MRE   Mine Risk Education 
MSP    Meeting of States Parties 
MYFF   Multi-Year Funding Framework 
NAMSA  NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency 
NNGO   National Non-Governmental Organisation 
SAC   Survey Action Centre 
SEEMACC  South East European Mine Action Co-ordination Council 
TOR   Terms of Reference 
UN   United Nations 
UNDAF  United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNMACA  United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan 
UNMAS  United Nations Mine Action Service 
UXO   Unexploded Ordnance 
 
 
 
